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Abstract—We address the problem of data-driven image ma-
nipulation detection in the presence of an attacker with limited
knowledge about the detector. Specifically, we assume that the
attacker knows the architecture of the detector, the training data
and the class of features V the detector can rely on. In order to
get an advantage in his race of arms with the attacker, the analyst
designs the detector by relying on a subset of features chosen at
random in V . Given its ignorance about the exact feature set, the
adversary attacks a version of the detector based on the entire
feature set. In this way, the effectiveness of the attack diminishes
since there is no guarantee that attacking a detector working in
the full feature space will result in a successful attack against the
reduced-feature detector. We theoretically prove that, thanks to
random feature selection, the security of the detector increases
significantly at the expense of a negligible loss of performance
in the absence of attacks. We also provide an experimental
validation of the proposed procedure by focusing on the detection
of two specific kinds of image manipulations, namely adaptive
histogram equalization and median filtering. The experiments
confirm the gain in security at the expense of a negligible loss of
performance in the absence of attacks.
Index Terms—Adversarial signal processing, Adversarial ma-
chine learning, Image manipulation detection, Feature selection,
Multimedia forensics and counter-forensics, Secure classification,
Randomization-based adversarial detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Developing secure image forensic tools, capable of granting
good performance even in the presence of an adversary aiming
at impeding the forensic analysis, turns out to be a difficult
task, given the weakness of the traces the forensic analysis re-
lies on [1]. As a matter of fact, a number of Counter-Forensics
(CF) tools have been developed, whose application hinders a
correct image forensic analysis [2]. Early CF techniques were
rather simple, as they consisted in the application of some
basic processing operators like noise dithering, recompression,
resampling or filtering [3], [4], [5]. Though often successful,
the application of general post-processing operators, some-
times referred to as laundering, does not guarantee that the
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forensic traces are completely erased and hence does not
necessarily result in the failure of the forensic analysis.
When the attacker has enough information about the foren-
sic algorithm, much more effective CF techniques can be
devised. By following the taxonomy introduced in [6], we say
that we are in a Perfect Knowledge (PK) scenario, when the
attacker has complete information about the forensic algorithm
used by the analyst. In the PK case, very powerful CF
techniques can be developed allowing the attacker to prevent
a correct analysis by introducing a limited distortion into the
attacked image. Generally speaking, the attacker needs only to
solve an optimisation problem looking for the image which is
in some sense closest to the image under attack and for which
the output of the forensic analysis is the wrong one. Even
if such an optimisation problem may not be always easy to
solve, the exact knowledge of the decision function allows the
application of powerful techniques either in closed form [7],
[8], [9], or by relying on gradient-descent mechanisms [10],
[11].
In many cases, the attacker has only a Limited Knowledge
about the forensic algorithm [6]. Let us consider, for example,
the case of a machine-learning-based detector looking for
the traces left within an image by a particular processing
algorithm. The attacker may know only the type of detector
used by the analyst, e.g. a Support Vector Machine (SVM) or
a Neural Network, and the feature space wherein the analysis
is carried out, but he may not have access to the training
data. In this case, the attacker can build a surrogate version
of the detector by using its own training data, and carry out
the attack on the surrogate detector, hoping that the attack
will also work on the detector used by the analyst [6], [10],
[11]. In other cases, the attacker may know only the feature
space used by the detector. In such a situation, he may resort
to a so-called universal CF strategy capable of defeating any
detector working in the given feature space [12]. In most
cases, the attack works by modifying the attacked-image so
that its representation in the feature space is as close as
possible to the representation of an image chosen in a dataset
of images belonging to the desired class (e.g. non-compressed
or pristine images) [10]. In [13], for instance, the attack works
by bringing the histogram of the attacked image as close as
possible to that of an image belonging to a reference dataset
of pristine images, by solving an optimal transport problem. In
[14], a similar strategy is applied in the DCT domain to attack
any double JPEG detector relying on the first order statistics
of block DCT coefficients.
Several anti-CF techniques have also been developed. The
most common approach consists in looking for the traces
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left by the CF tools, and develop new forensic algorithms
explicitly thought to expose images subjected to specific CF
techniques. The search for CF traces can be carried out by
relying on new features explicitly designed for this target as
in [15], [16], [17], [18], or, from a more general perspective,
by using the same features of the original forensic technique
and design an adversary-aware version of the classifier, as in
[19], [20]. In the latter case, it is recommendable to adopt a
large feature space allowing enough flexibility to distinguish
original and tampered images as well as images processed with
the CF operator. If we assume that the attacker knows that
the traces left by the CF tools may themselves be subjected
to a forensics analysis, we fall in a situation wherein CF
and anti-CF techniques are iteratively developed in a never-
ending loop, whose final outcome can hardly be foreseen [21].
Some attempts to cast the above race of arms between the
forensic analyst and the attacker by resorting to game theory
have been made in [22] and [23]. In some cases, it is also
possible to predict who between the attacker and the analyst
is going to win the game according to the distortion that
the attacker may introduce to impede the forensic analysis
[24]. Yet in other works, the structure of the detector is
designed in such a way to make CF harder. In [25], the output
of multiple classifiers is exploited to design an ensemble
classifier exhibiting improved resilience against adversarial
attempts to induce a detection error. In [26], the robustness
of a two-class classifier and the inherent superior security
of one-class classifiers are exploited to design a one and a
half class detector, that is proven to provide an extra degree
of robustness under adversarial conditions. Other approaches
to improve the security of machine-learning classifiers are
described in [27], [28], [29], for applications outside the
realm of image forensics. Despite all the above attempts,
however, when the attacker knows the feature space used by
the analyst, very powerful CF strategies can be designed whose
effectiveness is only partially mitigated by the adoption of anti-
CF countermeasures.
In order to restore the possibility of a sound forensic
analysis in an adversarial setting, and give the analyst an
advantage in his race of arms with the attacker, in this work,
we propose to randomise the selection of the feature space
wherein the analysis is carried out. To be specific, let us
assume that to achieve his goal - hereafter deciding between
two hypotheses H0 and H1 about the processing history of
the inspected image - the analyst may rely on a large set V of,
possibly dependent, features. The number of features used for
the analysis may be in the order of several hundreds or even
thousands; for instance, they may correspond to the SPAM
features described in [30] or the rich feature set introduced
in [31]. In most cases, the use of all the features in V is not
necessary and good results can be achieved even by using a
small subset of V . Our proposal to secure the forensic analysis
is to randomise it by choosing a random subset of V - call it
Vr - and let the analysis rely on Vr only; in a certain sense, the
randomisation of the feature space can be regarded as a secret
key used by the analyst to improve the security of the analysis.
Given its ignorance about the exact feature set used by the
analyst, a possibility for the attacker is to attack the entire
feature set V . As we will show throughout the paper, with
both theoretical and experimental results, not only attacking
the entire set V increases the complexity of the attack, but it
also diminishes its effectiveness, since there is no guarantee
that attacking a detector working in the full feature space will
also result in a successful attack against a detector working in
the reduced set Vr.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section
II, we revise prior works using randomisation to improve the
security of image forensic techniques and more in general
that of any detector or classifier. In Section III, we give
a rigorous formulation of image manipulation detection via
random feature selection, and analyse the theoretical perfor-
mance of the random detector under simplified, yet reasonable,
assumptions. In Section IV, we exemplify the general strategy
introduced in Section III by developing an SVM detector based
on randomised feature selection within a restricted subset of
SPAM features, designed to detect two different kinds of image
manipulations, namely adaptive histogram equalization and
median filtering. In Section V, we analyse the security of
the detectors described in Section IV against targeted attacks
carried out in the feature and the pixel domains. As it will
be evident from the experimental analysis, random feature
selection considerably increases the strength required for a
successful attack at the expense of a negligible performance
loss in the absence of attacks. Finally, in Section VI, we
draw our conclusions and highlight some directions for future
research.
II. RELATED WORKS
The use of randomisation to improve the security of a
detector or a classifier is not an absolute novelty since it has
already been proposed is several security-oriented applications.
Early attempts to use randomisation as a countermeasure
against attacks were focusing on probing or oracle attacks,
i.e. attacks that repeatedly query the detector in order to
get information about it and then use such an information
to build an input signal that evades the detection1 (see for
instance [32] for an example related to one-bit watermarking
and [28] for the use of randomisation in the context of machine
learning). In all these works, the outcome of the detector is
randomised by letting the output be chosen at random for
points in the proximity of the detection boundary. In general,
boundary randomisation only increases the effort necessary to
the attacker to enter (or exit) the detection region; in addition,
it also causes a loss of performance in the absence of attacks,
that is, the robustness of the system decreases.
Other strategies exploiting randomness to prevent the at-
tacker from gathering information about the detector have
been adopted for spam filtering, intrusion detection [25] and
multimedia authentication [33]. A rather common approach
consists in the use of randomisation in conjunction with
multiple classifiers. In [34], for instance, randomness pertains
to the selection of the training samples of the individual
classifiers, while in [35] is associated to the selection of
1Probing attacks are usually carried out when no any a-priori knowledge
about the classifier is available to the attacker.
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the features used by the classifiers (hereafter referred to as
random subspace selection), each of which is trained on the
entire training set. Another randomisation strategy, used in
conjunction with multiple classifiers, has been proposed in [36]
and experimentally evaluated for spam filtering applications.
Specifically, an additional source of randomness is introduced
in the choice of the weights of the filtering modules of the
individual classifiers. Random subspace selection has also
been adopted in steganalysis [37], though with a different goal,
that is to reduce the problems encountered when working with
extremely high-dimensional feature spaces.
The use of randomization for security purposes is also
common in multimedia hashing for authentication and content
identification [33], [38]. In these works, random projections
are often employed to elude attacks: specifically, a secret key
is used to generate a random matrix which is then employed to
generate the hash bits of the content, by first projecting the to-
be-authenticated signal on the directions identified by the rows
of the matrix and then comparing the absolute value of the
projections against a threshold. Despite the apparent similarity,
the use of random projections for multimedia hashing differs
substantially from the technique proposed in this paper. In
multimedia hashing applications, the random projection is
applied directly in the pixel or in a transformed domain, and
is possibly followed by the use of channel coding to improve
robustness against noise. The kind of traces we are looking for
in multimedia forensics applications, however, are so weak that
a completely random choice of the feature space would not
work. For this reason, in our system, randomisation is applied
within a set of features explicitly designed to work in a specific
multimedia forensics scenario. As a matter of fact, the system
proposed in this paper can be seen as the application of the
random projection method directly in the feature space, with
the projection matrix designed in such way to contain exactly
one non-zero in each row, with the additional computational
advantage that only the selected features need to be calculated,
while a full projection matrix would require the computation
of the entire feature set.
The use of feature selection for security purposes has also
been proposed in [39]. Although the idea of resorting to a
reduced feature set is similar to our proposal, the set up
considered in [39] differs considerably from the one adopted
in this paper. In [39], in fact, the authors search for the best
reduced feature set against an attacker with perfect knowledge
about the detector, i.e. an attacker who knows the choice of the
feature subset made by the defender. This is different from the
scenario considered here, where feature randomization works
as a kind of secret key.
III. SECURE DETECTION BY RANDOM FEATURE
SELECTION
In this section, we first describe the security assumptions
behind our work, then we give a rigorous definition of binary
detection based on Random Feature Selection (RFS) and
provide a theoretical analysis to evaluate the security vs
robustness trade-off under a simple statistical model. Though
derived under simplified assumptions, the theoretical analysis
Fig. 1. Security model for the RFS detector.
is an insightful one since it provides useful insights on the
impact that the statistics of the host features has on the security
of the randomised detector. In addition, it permits to analyse
the dependence of classification accuracy on the number of
selected features both in the presence and in the absence of
attacks. Even if the paper focuses on RFS, the theoretical
framework is a general one and can also be used to analyse
other kinds of (linear) feature randomisation.
A. Security model
The security model adopted in this paper is depicted in
Fig. 1. As shown in the picture, we assume that the attack
is carried out directly in the feature space. This is not a
problem when an invertible relationship exists between the
pixel and the feature domain, as it is the case, for instance, of
detectors based on block DCT coefficients or their histogram
[12], [14]. In other cases, however, mapping back the attack
into the pixel domain may not be easy, or even possible,
since there is no guarantee that the attacked feature vector
is a feasible one, i.e., that an image exists whose features
are equal to those resulting from the attack. Nevertheless,
analysing the performance of randomized feature detection
in this scenario, which is undoubtedly more favourable for
the attacker, provides interesting insights about the security
improvement achieved by RFS. We also assume that the
attacker is interested in inducing a missed detection error,
while minimising the distortion introduced in the image as
a consequence of the attack.
With regard to the knowledge available to the attacker,
we assume that he knows everything with the exception of
the subset of features used by the detector. This includes
knowledge of the detector architecture, the full feature set V ,
and the training set (in case of a detector based on machine
learning). We also assume that it is not possible for the attacker
to query the detector to observe the result of the detection
on one or more specific inputs. This means that the attacker
can not run oracle or mimicry attacks on the reduced feature
detector to infer information about the subset of features used
by the detector [40], [41].
In order to assess the security of the RFS approach when
faced with attacks carried out in the pixel domain, in section
V-C we show the results of some experiments where an RFS
detector trained to detect adaptive histogram equalization and
median filtering is subject to an attack working in the pixel
domain (see section IV-C for a description of the attack).
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B. Problem formulation
Let v be an n-long column vector with the image features
the detector relies on. The detector aims at distinguishing
between two hypotheses: H0 - ”the image is manipulated”, and
H1 - ”the image is original”. We assume that the probability
density function of v under the two hypotheses is as follows:
H0 : v ' N (u,Σ0) (1)
H1 : v ' N (−u,Σ1),
where N (u,Σ0) (res., N (−u,Σ1)), is a multivariate Gaussian
distribution with mean u (res., −u), and covariance matrix Σ0
(res., Σ1). Note that assuming that the mean vectors under the
two hypotheses are one the opposite of the other does not
cause any loss of generality. In fact, if this is not the case, we
can always apply a translation of the feature vector, for which
such an assumption holds.
The derivation of the optimal detector, under the assumption
that the a-priori probabilities of H0 and H1 are equal, passes
through the computation of the log-likelihood probabilities of
observing v under H0 and H1. In the following, we will carry
out our analysis by assuming that Σ0 = Σ1 = Σ. In this
case, the optimum detector is a correlation-based detector [42],
according to which the detector decides for H0 if:
ρ = (Σ−1u)Tv > 0. (2)
In the rest of the section, we will refer to the detector defined
by equation (2) as the optimum full-feature detector.
In order to improve the security of the system, the detector
randomises the decision strategy by relying on a reduced
feature vector vr = Sv where S is a random k × n-
dimensional matrix. Several different randomisation strategies
can be adopted according to the form of S. For the RFS
detector proposed in this paper, S is a matrix whose entries
are all zeros except for a single element of each row which
is equal to one. In addition, all nonzero entries are located in
different columns. This corresponds to form vr by selecting
at random k elements of v. Another possibility consists in
generating all the elements of S independently according to a
given distribution (e.g. Gaussian) and normalising the entries
so that the Euclidean norm of each row is equal to one. In this
way, the randomised detector relies on the projections of the
vector v on k random directions (Random Projection - RP).
C. Theoretical analysis
In this section, we analyse the trade-off between security
and robustness by evaluating the performance of the ran-
domised detector with and without attacks. As we will see,
by lowering k, the security of the detector increases at the
price of a loss of performance in the absence of attacks, with
a better trade-off reached by the RFS detector.
1) Performance in the absence of attacks (robustness): As
highlighted in the previous section, the sufficient statistics for
the optimum full-feature detector is given by ρ =
(
Σ−1u
)T
v.
The performance of the full-feature detector depend on the
statistics of ρ. Due to the normality of v, ρ is also normally
distributed with mean and variance under H0 given by:
E [ρ|H0] =
(
Σ−1u
)T
u = uTΣ−1u
var[ρ|H0] = (Σ−1u)TΣΣ−1u = uTΣ−1u.
(3)
Similar values are obtained under H1, by replacing u with −u.
The error probability of the detector is related to the z-value
of the normal distribution, which is equal to:
z =
uTΣ−1u
(uTΣ−1u)1/2
=
(
uTΣ−1u
)1/2
. (4)
Note that z is always positive since Σ is a positive-definite
matrix and that higher values of z correspond to a lower error
probability. Due to the symmetry of the problem, the two error
probabilities, i.e., the probability of deciding in favour of H0
when H1 holds and the reverse probability of deciding for H1
when H0 holds, have the same value; hence, in the following,
we will generally refer to the error probability as Pe.
In the case of randomised detection, the feature vector is:
vr = S · v. For a given S, the statistics of the observations
under the two hypotheses are as follows:
H0 : vr ' N(ur,Σr)
H1 : vr ' N(−ur,Σr),
(5)
where we let ur = Su and Σr = SΣST . The optimum
detector now decides for H0 when ρr =
(
Σ−1r ur
)T
vr > 0.
As for the full detector, ρr is a Gaussian r.v. with mean and
variance (under H0) given by:
E [ρr|H0] = uTr Σ−1r ur
var[ρr|H0] = uTr Σ−1r ur.
(6)
Once again the error probability depends on the z-value of
the randomized detector, which is zr =
(
uTr Σ
−1
r ur
)1/2
. By
introducing the factor
η =
uTr Σ
−1
r ur
uTΣ−1u
, (7)
the z-value of the randomised detector can be related to that
of the full-feature detector as follows:
zr =
√
ηz. (8)
Given that η is always lower than one and decreases when
k decreases, equations (7) and (8) determine the loss of
performance due to the use of the randomised reduced-feature
detector instead of the full-feature one. Since in this case
the errors are due to the natural variability of the observed
features, the loss of performance can be regarded as a loss of
robustness.
2) Performance under attack (security): Given that the
attacker does not know the subset of features used by the
randomised detector and, in principle, he does not even know
about the randomization-based defence mechanism, we can
assume that he keeps attacking the full-feature detector (an
alternative strategy is considered in Section V-D). Without
loss of generality, we will assume that the attacker takes
a sequence generated under H0 and modifies it in such a
way that the detector decides in favour of H1. The optimum
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attack is the one that succeeds in inducing a decision error
while minimising the distortion introduced within v. Such an
attack is obtained by moving the vector v orthogonally to the
decision boundary until ρ = 0, leading to:
v∗ = v − α
(
Σ−1u
)T
v
‖Σ−1u‖2 · Σ
−1u, (9)
where v∗ is the attacked feature vector and α is a parameter
controlling the strength of the attack: with α = 1 the attacked
vector is moved exactly on the decision boundary, however
the attacker may decide to use a larger α (introducing a larger
distortion) so to move the attacked vector more inside the
wrong decision region, hence increasing the probability that
the attack is successful also against the randomised detector.
By construction, when applied against the full feature detec-
tor the above attack is always successful. We now investigate
the effect of the attack defined in (9), when the analyst uses
a randomised detector based on a reduced set of features. We
start by observing that, as a consequence of the attack, the
value of ρr evaluated by the randomised detector is:
ρr = u
T
r Σ
−1
r vr − α
uTr Σ
−1
r wr
||w||2 w
Tv, (10)
where we let w = Σ−1u, wr = Sw, and θ =
α(uTr Σ
−1
r wr/||w||2). The statistics of ρr are given by the
following lemma.
Lemma 1. By letting y = uTr Σ−1r ur, and x = uTΣ−1u, we
have that under H0:
E[ρr] = y − θx, var[ρr] = y + θ2x− 2θy. (11)
Proof. See the appendix.
It is worth observing that Lemma 1 holds under the assump-
tion that the attacker applies equation (9) even when the full-
feature detector decides for H1, that is when ρ < 0. In general
this will not be the case, since when the detector already makes
an error due to the presence of noise, the attacker has no
interest to modify v. In fact, in this case, the result of the
application of equation (9) would be the correction of the error
made by the detector. Given that deriving the statistics of ρr
by taking into account that the attack is present only when
ρ > 0 is an intractable problem, we assume that equation (9)
always holds. The results obtained in this way provide a good
approximation of the real performance of the system when the
error probability of the full-feature detector in the absence of
attacks is negligible, i.e., when z is much larger than 1.
The z-value of the randomised detector under attack can
then be written as
zatt = z
η − θ√
η + θ2 − 2ηθ , (12)
where η, defined as in (7), is equal to y/x. Note that, due to
the attack, zatt can also take negative values thus resulting in
a large error probability.
The interpretation of equation (12) is rather difficult since η
and θ depend on v in a complicated way. In the next section
we will use numerical simulations to get more insight into
the performance predicted by (12). Here we observe that the
expression of zatt can be simplified considerably when Σ =
σ2I , that is when the features are independent and have all
the same variance, and the rows of S are orthogonal, as with
RFS. In this case, it is easy to see that:
θ = α
||ur||2
||u||2 , η =
||ur||2
||u||2 , (13)
and hence θ = αη. Equation (12) can then be rewritten as:
zatt = z
η(1− α)√
η + α2η2 − 2αη2 . (14)
From equations (13) and (14), we see that the error probability
under attack depends only on η , that is the ratio of the norm
of the vector with the mean value of the reduced set of features
and the norm of the full-feature mean vector. Clearly, when
the number k of features used by the randomised detector
decreases, the value of η decreases as well. Given that the
numerator in (14) is either null or negative, and given that the
quantity
η√
η + α2η2 − 2αη2 =
1√
1
η + α
2 − 2α
(15)
increases when η decreases, the error probability under attack
decreases with k. In fact, if η approaches zero, i.e., k = 1, zatt
will be close to 0, and the error probability under attack tends
to 0.5. In other words, the probability that an attack against the
full feature detector is also affective against a reduced detector
based on one feature only is 0.5 (the improved security comes
at the price of a reduced effectiveness in the absence of attacks,
as stated by equation (8)). As we will see in the next section,
even better results are obtained when the features are not
independent. Expectedly, it is also easy to see that when η = 1,
that is when all the features are used, zatt = −z, hence
resulting in a very large error probability2.
D. Numerical results
In this section, we use numerical analysis to study the
performance of the randomised detector both in the presence
and in the absence of attacks as predicted by equations (8)
and (12).
We start with the simple case of i.i.d. features. The per-
formance predicted by the theory are reported in Fig. 2,
where we show the dependence on k of the missed detection
error probability both in the presence (upper curves) and in
the absence (lower curves) of attacks3. The plots have been
obtained by letting n = 300, z = 4, and averaging over 500
random choices of the matrix S. We set α = 1.2 for the
leftmost plot and α = 2 for the rightmost. As it can be seen, no
particular difference can be noticed between the RFS and RP
detectors. The security of the randomised detector increases for
lower values of k, while the performance in the absence attacks
decreases. As predicted by equation (15), when the number of
2In fact, when η = 1 the error probability should be equal to 1. This is
not the case in the present analysis due to the assumption we made that the
attacker always applies equation (9), even when ρ < 0.
3Due to the symmetry of the problem, in the absence of attacks, the missed
detection probability is equal to the overall error probability.
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Fig. 2. Missed detection error probability of the randomised feature detector
with and without attacks in the case of i.i.d. features. The plots have been
obtained by letting z = 4, n = 300, α = 1.2 (a), α = 2 (b), and averaging
over 200 random choices of the matrix S.
1 50 100 150 200 250 300
k
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
P e
Error probability vs size of reduced feature set (  = 1.2)
RFS under attack
RP under attack
RFS no attack
RP no attack
(a)
1 50 100 150 200 250 300
k
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
P e
Error probability vs size of reduced feature set (  = 2)
RFS under attack
RP under attack
RFS no attack
RP no attack
(b)
1 50 100 150 200 250 300
k
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
P e
Error probability vs size of reduced feature set (, = 1.2)
RFS under attack
RP under attack
RFS no attack
RP no attack
(c)
1 50 100 150 200 250 300
k
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
P e
Error probability vs size of reduced feature set (, = 2)
RFS under attack
RP under attack
RFS no attack
RP no attack
(d)
Fig. 3. Missed detection error probability of the randomised feature detector
with and without attacks, in the case of dependent features. The plots have
been obtained by letting n = 300, α = 1.2 (a)-(c), and α = 2, (b)-(d). In
(a) and (b) the features variance is not normalised while (c) and (d) refer to
the case of normalised features. In all cases the error probability has been
obtained by averaging over 500 random choices of the host feature statistics
and the matrix S. The average value of z was: (a) z = 4.9, (b) z = 5, (c)
z = 4.8, (d) z = 4.9.
features used by the detector tends to 1, the error probability
in the presence of attacks tends to 0.5, thus showing that the
attack designed to defeat the full-feature detector fails almost
half of the times when the reduced feature detector is used.
Expectedly, the attack is more successful for larger α.
We now consider the more general case of dependent
features. To do so, we set the statistics of the host features
as follows: i) constant mean vector u (we also run some
simulations with a randomly generated mean vector obtaining
very similar results), ii) random covariance matrix constructed
by first generating a diagonal matrix with uniformly distributed
random diagonal entries, and then randomly rotating the
diagonal matrix so to obtain dependent features. We observe
that in this way the features have different variances, however,
especially after the random rotation, the difference among the
variances is not big. This agrees with a practical setup in
which the detector relies on normalised features. To force a
different variance among features, we considered an additional
setup in which the variance of the features is scaled after
the random rotation of the covariance matrix. We did so by
randomly generating a vector of scaling factors uniformly
distributed between 0 and 1 and applying the square root of the
scaling factors to the features. We used the square root of the
random scaling factors to limit the scale differences among the
features. In the following we refer to the first case as dependent
normalised features and to the second as dependent features.
Alike in the i.i.d. case, we let n = 300 and averaged the
results over 500 repetitions, each time by randomly generating
a new covariance matrix and a new matrix S. Even in this case,
we considered two different values of α, namely: α = 1.2
and α = 2. Fig. 3 reports the results that we have obtained.
Due to the randomness involved in the generation of the
feature statistics, we could not control the exact value of z,
the values resulting from each experiment are reported in the
caption of the figure. As in Fig. 2, no particular difference
is observed between the RFS and RP cases, however, the
overall behaviour of the detector is completely different with
respect to the i.i.d. case. The error probability under attack now
decreases more rapidly when the number of features used by
the detector is reduced, thus indicating a high security level.
After a certain point, however, the error probability increases
again approaching 0.5 when k tends to 1. Such a behaviour
can be interpreted as a loss of robustness rather than a loss of
security. In fact, the error probability in the absence of attacks
exhibits a similar increase when k decreases, indicating that
the detector is not able to distinguish between H0 and H1
by relying on few features only. Of course, such a problem
has an impact also on the error probability in the presence of
attacks. Overall, the reduced detector performs better in the
case of dependent features, however, higher values of k must
be used with respect to the i.i.d. case. We also observe that a
significantly higher security level is obtained for the case of
normalised features (cases (c) and (d) in Fig. 3). In addition,
increasing the value of α does not have a great impact on the
success rate of the attack, especially in the case of normalized
features.
In order to explain the plots reported in Fig. 3, noticeably
their difference with respect to Fig. 2, we need to analyse
in more detail the reason behind the security improvement
achieved through random feature selection. We will do so by
referring to the RFS case, however the same considerations
can be applied to the RP case. We start by observing that the
optimal attack given in the rightmost part of equation (9) can
be decomposed in two parts: a scaling factor a and a direction
eatt:
a = α
(
Σ−1u
)T
v
‖Σ−1u‖
eatt =
Σ−1u
‖Σ−1u‖ .
(16)
The direction eatt ensures the optimality of the attack, since
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it is chosen so to be orthogonal to the boundary of the decision
regions. The scaling factor a is chosen in such a way to move
the attacked feature vector exactly on the boundary of the
decision regions (α = 1) or inside the target region (α > 1).
With the randomized feature detector, the attack vector is
projected onto a subspace with lower dimensionality and both
the scaling factor and the direction of the projected attack
vector are no more optimal. The non-optimality of the scaling
factor (scale mismatch) implies that sometimes the magnitude
of the projected attack vector is too small thus failing to induce
a decision error. Such a probability is augmented by the non-
optimality of the direction of the projected attack vector, since
there is no guarantee that such a direction is orthogonal to the
decision boundary of the RFS detector. In order to understand
when and to which extent the angle mismatch between the
optimal attack direction and the direction of the projected
attack vector affects the security of the RSF detector, let
us consider the expression of such directions. The direction
orthogonal to the decision boundary of the RFS detector is:
eRFS =
Σ−1r ur
‖Σ−1r ur‖
, (17)
while the projection of eatt on the reduced feature space is:
eatt,r =
SΣ−1u
‖SΣ−1u‖ . (18)
In the case of i.i.d. feature, it is easy to see that the above
directions coincide given that Σ−1r = Ik×k, Σ
−1 = In×n and
SST = Ik×k. This is not the case with dependent features.
To understand the importance of the angle mismatch in this
case, we randomly generated 1000 pairs of covariance matrixes
and random selection matrices S. Then we plot the histogram
of the angle mismatch. The results we got are reported in
Fig. 4, for both the cases of non-normalized and normalized
features. The figure shows the results for k = 50, 150 and 250
(similar results hold for other values of k). Upon inspection
of the figure, we can see that the angle mismatch is much
larger in the case of normalized features, thus explaining the
higher security performance of the randomized detector in this
case. For small values of k the mismatch is so large that the
attack vector is almost orthogonal to the optimal direction,
thus nullifying the effect of the attack. Such an observation
also explains why in this case increasing α does not increase
the effectiveness of the attack, in fact, the increased value of
the magnitude of the attack is wasted since the direction of
the attack is a wrong one.
Given that the particular form of the matrix S does not
have a significant impact on the performance of the reduced
detector, in the following we focus on the RFS case only.
An advantage of such an approach is its lower computational
complexity. In the RP cases, in fact, the detector must compute
the entire feature vector and then choose only k linear com-
binations. In the RFS case, instead, the detector can compute
only the features that it intends to use, avoiding to calculate the
non-selected features; this may allow a significant reduction
of the complexity, especially for large values of n and small
values of k.
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Non-normalized features, k = 250
(a)
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0
Non-normalized features, k = 150
(b)
0 50 100 150 200
angle
0
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0
Normalized features, k = 250
(d)
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(f)
Fig. 4. Angle mismatch between the projection of the attack vector on the
feature space of the RFS detector and the optimal attack direction for the RFS
detector. Plots (a)-(c) refer to the case of non-normalized features, while plots
(d)-(e) correspond to the case of normalized features.
IV. APPLICATION TO IMAGE MANIPULATION DETECTION
The theoretical analysis given in the previous section sug-
gests that a detector based on a randomised subset of features
provides a better security with respect to a full-feature detector.
The applicability of such an idea to real world applications,
however, requires great care, since the assumptions behind
the theoretical analysis are ideal ones and are rarely met in
practice. Since the goal of this paper is to improve the security
of image forensic techniques against counter-forensic attacks,
in this section, we introduce an SVM-based detector based
on random feature selection and apply it to two particular
image forensic problems, namely the detection of adaptive
histogram equalization and the detection of median filtering.
The full feature space consists of a subset of SPAM features
[30], however the SVM detector is trained by relying only on
a random subset of the full feature set. As we will see, the
loss of performance of the RFS SVM detector in the absence
of attacks is very limited, even for rather small values of k.
We also introduce two attacks aiming at deceiving the SVM
detector. Both attacks are based on gradient descent, the first
one works in the feature domain, while the second operates
directly in the pixel domain. The attacks are very powerful
since they were able to prevent a correct detection in all the
test images. In particular, the attack operating in the pixel
domain is a very practical one since it does not require to
map back the attack from the feature to the pixel-domain
and can prevent a correct detection by introducing a limited
distortion in the attacked image. In Section V, we will use
these attacks to demonstrate the improved security ensured by
the RFS detector.
A. RFS SVM-based detection of image manipulations
Residual-based features, originally devised for steganalysis
applications [30], [31], have been used with success in many
image forensic applications, including forgery detection [43],
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detection of pixel-domain enhancement, spatial filtering, re-
sampling and lossy compression [44]. In particular, in this
paper, we consider the SPAM feature set [30]. Since we carried
out all our tests on grey-level images, we assume that these
features are computed directly on grey-level pixel values, or on
the luminance component derived from the RGB colour bands.
Feature computation consists of three steps. In the first step,
residual values are computed; specifically, the difference 2-
D arrays are evaluated along horizontal, vertical and diagonal
directions. In the second step, the residual values are truncated
so that their maximum absolute value is equal to T . Finally,
the co-occurrence matrices are computed. Depending on the
value of T and the order of the co-occurences considered in
the computation, different sets of features with different sizes
are obtained. We use second-order SPAM features with T = 3,
for a dimensionality of the feature space of 686.
Based on the SPAM features, we built an SVM detector
aiming at revealing Adaptive Histogram Equalization (AHE)
and Median Filtering (MF). With regard to AHE, we consid-
ered the contrast-limited algorithm (CLAHE) implemented by
Matlab function adapthisteq with cliplimit = 0.02. Some
sample images manipulated in this way are shown in the
second column in Fig. 5. With regard to MF, we considered
window sizes 3× 3, 5× 5 and 7× 7, (MF3, MF5, MF7).
To train and test the detectors, we used a set of 2000 images
from the RAISE-2k dataset [45]. Specifically, we used 1400
images for training and 600 images for testing. To speed up
the experiments, the images were downsampled by factor 4
and converted to grayscale. The SVM models are built by
using the tools provided by the LibSVM library [46]. The RBF
kernel is used for all the SVMs. The results of the tests are
shown in the first row of Table II. All the four detectors got a
100% accuracy on the test data, thus confirming the excellent
capabilities of the SVM trained with the SPAM features to
detect global image manipulations like median filtering and
histogram equalization.
To double-check that the SVM model does not overfit to
the training data, Table I shows the number of support vectors
for the SVM detector trained on the full feature set. These
numbers are very low compared to the number of examples
considered for training, which is 2800 (1400 per class). More
specifically, the ratio between the number of support vectors
and training examples is around 0.04 - 0.05 (which can
be taken as a good indication of the upper bound of the
generalisation error [47]).
TABLE I
NUMBERS OF SUPPORT VECTORS OF FULL-FEATURE SVM MODEL
AHE MF3 MF5 MF7
Num. of support vectors 62 59 71 69
We also carried out some tests with a linear SVM, however
we found that the linear model does not discriminate well the
two classes when the number of features decreases to less than
100-200, thus preventing the application of RFS with small
values of k.
TABLE II
ERROR PROBABILITY OF SPAM-BASED SVM DETECTORS IN THE
ABSENCE AND PRESENCE OF ATTACKS (ε = 0.5).
AHE MF3 MF5 MF7
Manipulated 0% 0% 0% 0%
Attack in feature domain 100% 100% 100% 100%
Attack in pixel domain 100% 100% 100% 100%
B. Attack in the feature domain
In this section, we describe the feature domain attack we
have implemented against the RFS SVM detectors.
The attack in the feature domain has been built by following
the system described in [6]. Specifically, given a feature vector
v and a discriminant function g(·), we assume that the detector
decides that v belongs to a manipulated image if g(v) > 0,
and to an original image otherwise. In this setup, the optimally
attacked vector v∗ is determined by solving the following
minimization problem:
v? = arg min
v′:g(v′)≤−ν
d(v,v′), (19)
where d(·, ·) is a suitable distortion measure and ν is a safe
margin, which, similarly to the parameter α in Section III,
permits to move the attacked vector more or less inside the
acceptance region. For an SVM detector, the discriminant
function can be written as:
g(v) =
∑
i
αiyik(v,vi) + b, (20)
where αi and yi are, respectively, the support value and the
label of the i−th support vector vi, and where k() is the kernel
function. In our implementation, the minimization problem
is solved by using a gradient descent algorithm, where the
gradient at each iteration is computed as:
∇g(v) =
∑
i
αiyi∇k(v,vi). (21)
The discrimination function and the corresponding gradient
for different kernels are reported in Table III.
As a matter of fact, in our implementation we used the prob-
abilistic output of the SVM rather than g(v). The probabilistic
output is built by mapping g(v) into the [0, 1] range and by
letting the value g(v) = 0 correspond to a probabilistic output
equal to 0.5. By indicating the probabilistic output of the SVM
with p(v), the minimization problem in (19) can be rewritten
as:
v? = arg min
v′:p(v′)≤ε
d(v,v′), (22)
where ε = 0.5 (equivalent to ν = 0) corresponds to an attacked
feature vector lying on the decision boundary and values of
ε < 0.5 introduce a safe margin bringing the attacked vector
deeper inside the wrong detection region.
We attacked the full-feature SVM detectors for AHE and
MF by applying the gradient descent attack in the feature
domain; even with ε = 0.5, the attack was able to deceive
all the detectors, as reported in the second row of Table II.
The distortion introduced by the attack for ε = 0.5, 0.3 and
0.1 is given in Table. IV. As expected the distortion increases
for smaller values of ε. We observe that the distortion values
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Fig. 5. Examples of manipulated and attacked images: (a) and (d) show the original images; (b) the image manipulated by AHE; (e) the image manipulated
by MF3; (c), and (f) the images after a pixel-domain attack with ε = 0.5.
TABLE III
DISCRIMINATION FUNCTIONS AND CORRESPONDING GRADIENT FOR DIFFERENT SVM KERNELS
g(v) ∇g(v)
Linear kernel k (v,vi) = vTvi
∑
i
aiyivi
Polynomial kernel k (v,vi) =
(
vTvi + c
)p ∑
i
aiyip
(
vTvi + c
)p−1
vi
RBF kernel k (v,vi) = exp
(
−γ||v − vi||2
)
−∑
i
2γaiyi exp
(
−γ||v − vi||2
)
(v − vi)
reported in the table do not give an immediate indication of
the distortion of the attacked image, due to the difficulties
of mapping back the attacked feature vector into the pixel
domain.
TABLE IV
AVERAGE SNR (dB) COMPUTED ON THE FEATURES OF 600 ATTACKED
IMAGES. SNR IS DEFINED AS THE RATIO BETWEEN THE ENERGY OF THE
FEATURE VECTOR BEFORE THE ATTACK AND THE ENERGY OF THE
DISTORTION.
ε = 0.5 ε = 0.3 ε = 0.1
AHE 26.01 25.09 23.88
MF3 18.59 17.53 16.1
MF5 19.19 18.15 16.76
MF7 19.15 18.12 16.72
C. Attack in the pixel domain
In a realistic scenario, the attacker will carry out his attack
in the pixel domain. Similarly to equation (22), the goal
of the attack in the pixel domain is to solve the following
optimisation problem:
I? = arg min
I′:p(f(I′))≤ε
d(I, I ′). (23)
where f(·) is the feature extraction function (i.e. f(I) = v)
and, as before, p indicates the probabilistic output of the SVM.
Due to the complicated form of f(·) and to the necessity of
preserving the integer nature of pixel values, gradient descent
can not be applied directly to solve (23). For this reason we
implemented the attack as described in [11], by setting to 20%
the percentage of pixels modified at each iteration of the attack
(see [11] for more details).
The results of the attack on the same dataset used in Section
IV-A are reported in the last row of Table II. Only the results
for ε = 0.5 are shown for simplicity. The results show that
the attack always succeeds for all the detectors. The average
distortion introduced within the attacked images is reported in
Table V, while some examples of attacked images are given
in the third column of Fig. 5.
TABLE V
AVERAGE PSNR (dB) OF THE 600 ATTACKED IMAGES
ε = 0.5 ε = 0.3 ε = 0.1
AHE 54.49 53.09 51.96
MF3 56.77 56.43 54.17
MF5 56.79 55.51 53.37
MF7 56.43 54.73 52.63
V. SECURITY OF RFS-BASED MANIPULATION DETECTION
AGAINST FEATURE-DOMAIN AND PIXEL-DOMAIN ATTACKS
In this section, we show the improved security provided
by RFS by testing the adaptive histogram equalization and
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median filtering detectors introduced in Section IV-A against
the attacks presented in Sections IV-B and IV-C.
A. Experimental methodology
In our experiments, we used the same setting described
in Section IV-A. The SVM models were trained by using
a randomly selected subset of SPAM features extracted
from the training set. We considered two versions of the
detectors. The first version relies on SPAM features as
they are, with no normalisation. The second versions is
built by normalising the SPAM features before feeding
them to the SVM. Normalization is applied both during
the training and testing phases, and is achieved by dividing
each feature by its standard deviation, estimated on the
training set. The two versions of the detector correspond
to the two scenarios considered in Sect. III-D (see Fig.
3). The processed images were attacked by using the two
methods presented in Section IV-B and IV-C. In both cases,
we assumed that the attacker has access to a version of
the full-feature SVM detectors trained on the same dataset
used by the analyst. The performance of the RFS SVM
detectors were then evaluated on both the attacked and
non-attacked images for different values of k. We repeated
the experiments 100 times, each time using a different matrix
S. Various stopping conditions, namely ε = {0.1, 0.3, 0.5},
were considered for both the attacks. For the dimension of
the reduced feature set, we considered values of k in the
range {1, 3, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, 686}.
The value of γ (see Table III) was obtained by means of
5-fold cross-validation carried out on the training set. To
evaluate the performance in the absence of attacks, we
considered both false alarms and missed detections, while for
the security in the presence of attacks, we considered only
the missed detection probability, since in our setup the goal
of the attacker is to induce a missed detection event.
B. Security vs robustness tradeoff: feature domain
In this section, we describe the performance of the RFS de-
tectors against the feature-domain attack described in Section
IV-B. As we already pointed out, this is an ideal situation for
the attacker, since in real applications the attacker usually does
not have access to the feature domain and the inverse-mapping
from the feature domain to the pixel domain is often a difficult
task. As we will see, despite the setup is more favourable to
the attacker than in the case of a pixel domain attack, the
RFS detector exhibits a good security. Fig. 6 shows the error
probability of the RFS detector as a function of k with and
without attacks for the MF3 and AHE detectors. The plots
shown in parts (a) and (b) refer to the case of non-normalized
features, while the results shown in parts (c) and (d) have
been obtained by normalising the feature vector. Despite some
unavoidable differences, the overall behaviour predicted by the
theoretical analysis is confirmed. To start with, the experiments
confirm that reducing the dimension of the feature set does not
impact much the performance of the detector in the absence
of attacks. In fact, even with k = 1, the probability of correct
detection is still around 0.8 for AHE and 0.7 for MF3 for the
case of non-normalized features (Fig. 6 (a) and (b)). Similar
results hold in the normalized feature case (Fig. 6 (c) and (d)).
In the presence of attacks, the missed detection probability
of the RFS detectors is significantly lower than that of the
full-feature detector (k = 686 in the figure). For the non-
normalized case, we observe that when the stopping condition
of the attack is equal to 0.5, the missed detection probability
drops even for rather large values of k, while for ε = 0.3 and
ε = 0.1, smaller values of k are needed to make the missed
detection probability drop. With regard to the detector based
on normalised features, the experiments confirm the results
predicted by the theory, since feature normalization results in
a significantly more secure detector. In fact, for the normalized
feature case we observe that the missed detection probability
immediately drops when k is below a critical very large value
of k, which depends on the stopping condition of the attack. In
particular, for the AHE case, the missed detection error drops
below around k = 400 for ε = 0.1, k = 500 for ε = 0.3
and k = 600 for ε = 0.5. For the MF3 case, the situation is
even more favorable. First of all we must mention that in this
case the stopping conditions were set to ε = 0.5 and 0.45 only.
The reason for such a choice is that reaching ε = 0.45 already
requires a large number of iterations and a very strong attack.
In fact, the SNR of the attacked feature vector for ε = 0.45
is 4.19 (while it was 7.45 for the AHE case with ε = 0.1).
The results in Fig. 6 clearly show that a suitable value of
k can be found where the error probability in the absence
of attacks (both false alarm and missed detection) is still
negligible and the missed detection probability under attack
is significantly smaller than 1. The results obtained with the
MF5 and MF7 detectors are shown in Fig. 7 for the case
of non-normalized features. We see that, with respect to the
MF3 case, a lower k is necessary to get a small missed
detection probability under attacks, especially for the MF7
case. The motivation for this behaviour is that, in these cases,
the separation between the two classes with respect to the
intraclass feature variation is very large, thus diminishing the
impact of the scale mismatch on the effectiveness of the attack
carried out on the full feature set.
C. Security vs robustness tradeoff: pixel domain
In this section, we focus on the security of the RFS detectors
against the pixel domain attack introduced in [11] and briefly
described in Section IV-C. Before going on with the discussion
of the results, we stress that attacking the images directly in
the pixel domain requires a very high computational effort4,
so we limited our analysis to a lower number of cases, which,
however, are sufficient to show the good performance achieved
by the RFS detectors.
In Fig. 8, we show the error probability of the RFS detectors
based on non-normalized features. The overall trend of the
4With the attack method in [11], attacking a single image on a 4-core PC,
running at 3.3 GHz equipped with 16 GB RAM requires around two hours
on the average. By considering that each curve in the figures shown in this
section requires attacking 600 images (and that the effectiveness of the attack
must be evaluated for all the images, for all values of k and 100 different
selection matrices S for each k), each curve takes more than one month to
be computed.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 6. Error probability of the randomised feature detector without attacks and under a feature-domain attack, in the case of AHE and MF3 detection. (a)
and (b) refer to the case of non-normalized features, while (c) and (d) have been obtained by normalizing the features before feeding them to the detector.
The missed detection (MD) probability is reported for both the non-attacked and attacked images, by letting ε = {0.5; 0.3; 0.1} (in (a), (b) and (c)), and
ε = {0.5; 0.45} (in (d)). The false alarm (FA) is also reported. The plots have been obtained averaging over 100 random choices of the matrix S.
(a) (b)
Fig. 7. Error probability of the randomised feature detector without attacks and under a feature-domain attack, in the case of MF5 (a) and MF7 (b) detection
with non-normalized features. The MD probability is reported for both the non-attacked and attacked images, by letting ε = {0.5; 0.3; 0.1}. The FA is also
reported. The plots have been obtained averaging over 100 random choices of the matrix S. The curves of the FA and the MD for the no-attack case are
overlapped.
error probability is similar to that observed for the feature-
domain attack, however the error probability is now much
smaller, confirming that the possibility of carrying out the
attack in the feature domain, would represent a significant
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(b)
Fig. 8. Error probability of the randomised feature detector under pixel-
domain attack, in the case of AHE (a) and MF3 (b) detection with
non-normalized features. The plots have been obtained by attacking with
ε = {0.5, 0.3, 0.1} and averaging over 100 random choices of the matrix
S. The FA and the MD probabilities in the presence and absence of attacks
are reported.
advantage for the attacker. By letting k = 20, for instance, the
missed detection probability in the presence of attacks ranges
from 0.36 to 0.55 in the case of AHE and from 0.29 to 0.59
in the case of MF3, while the missed detection probability
without attacks is equal to 0.013 and 0, respectively. As for
the feature domain attack, the false alarm probability remains
low (around 0) even for very small values of k, e.g. k = 10.
We also carried out some experiments with the AHE-
SVM detector relying on normalized features. The results we
have got are reported in Fig. 9. The general trend of the
error probability agrees with that predicted by theory, and
confirms that the RFS detector based on normalized features
is considerably more secure than the detector based on non-
normalized features.
D. Other attack strategies
Throughout the paper we have assumed that the attacker
designs his attack by targeting the full feature detector. While
this is a reasonable approach, if we assume that the attack
is aware of the defence mechanism other attack strategies are
possible. By assuming that the value of k is publicly available,
the attacker could decide to attack a subset of k features at
random, or he could decide to attack the k most important
features chosen based on principal component analysis. While
Fig. 9. Error probability of the RFS detector in the AHE case with
normalized features under a pixel domain attack. The MD probability is
reported for both the non-attacked and attacked images, with ε = 0.5. The
FA is also reported. The plots have been obtained averaging over 100 random
choices of the matrix S.
Fig. 10. Block diagram of the alternative attack strategy described in Sect.
V-D. The number of reduced features k adopted by the real classifier is
assumed to be known to the attacker; gi denotes the discriminant function
of the SVM trained on the i-th feature set.
we leave a thorough exploration of alternative attack strategies
to a future work, in this section we evaluate the security of
the randomized feature detector when the attack targets an
expected version of the classifier, computed by averaging N
random predictions obtained by N different classifiers trained
on N different random subset of k features. Specifically, we
consider the attack setup depicted in Fig. 10. This strategy
resembles the Expectation Over Transformation (EOT) attack
which has been recently proposed against randomized neural
network classifiers [48]. As suggested by its name, such
method computes the gradient over the expected transforma-
tion of the input. In our case, the transformation consists in
the selection of the k features.
For sake of brevity, we implemented the attack depicted
in the figure by operating in the feature domain and by
considering the case of non-normalized features. With regard
to the number of classifiers used to build the attack, we
considered the cases N = 50, and N = 100. The results
we have got are reported in Fig. 11. Upon inspection of the
plots reported in the figure, we see that the effectiveness of the
new attack increases with N and it is comparable to that of the
attack carried on the full feature detector (indeed always worse
than that in the case of median filtering), thus confirming the
security improvement achieved by the RFS detector, even in
the presence of more elaborated attacks.
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Fig. 11. Error probability of the randomised feature detector without attacks and under a feature-domain attack obtained by averaging 50 (cases (a) and (c))
and 100 (cases (b) and (d)) SVM detectors, in the case of AHE ((a) and (b)) and MF3 ((c) and (d)) with non-normalized features. The MD probability is
reported for both the non-attacked and attacked images, by letting ε = {0.5; 0.3; 0.1}. The FA is also reported. The plots have been obtained averaging over
100 random choices of the matrix S.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The use of machine learning tools in the context of image
forensics is endangered by the relative ease with which such
tools can be deceived by an informed attacker. In this paper,
we have considered a particular instantiation of the above
problem, wherein the attacker knows the architecture of the
detector, the data used to train it and the class of features
the detector relies on. Specifically, we introduced a mecha-
nism whereby the analyst designs the detector by randomly
choosing the features used by the detector from an initial
large set V also known by the attacker. We first presented
some theoretical results, obtained by relying on a simplified
model, suggesting that random feature selection permits to
greatly enhance security at the expense of a slight loss of
performance in the absence of attacks. Then, we applied our
strategy to the detection of two specific image manipulations,
namely adaptive histogram equalization and median filtering,
by resorting to SVM classification, based on the SPAM feature
set. The security analysis, carried out by attacking the two
detectors both in the feature and the pixel domain, confirms
that security can indeed be improved by means of random
feature selection, with a gain that is even more significant than
that predicted by the simplified theoretical analysis. In fact, the
probability of a successful attack drops from nearly 1 to less
than 0.4 in the realistic case that the attack is carried out in the
pixel domain. We remark that, while an error probability lower
than 0.4 would be preferable, this may be already enough to
discourage the attacker in applications wherein ensuring that
the attack is successful is a vital requirement for the attacker.
This work is only a first attempt to exploit randomisation,
noticeably feature space randomisation, to restore the credi-
bility of the forensic analysis in adversarial settings. From a
theoretical perspective, more accurate models could be used
to further reduce the gap between the analysis carried out in
Section III and the conditions encountered in real applications.
From a practical point of view, the use of random feature
selection with detectors other than SVMs could be explored,
together with the adoption of much larger feature sets, e.g., the
entire set of rich features [31]. Another interesting research
direction consists in the extension of our approach to counter
attacks against detectors based on deep learning, specifically
convolutional neural networks. In such a case, in fact, the
features used by the detector are not chosen by the analyst,
since they are determined by the network during the training
phase, hence calling for the adoption of other forms of
randomisation (see [49] and [50] for some preliminary works
in this direction).
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1.
Let ρr = ρr,1 − θρr,2, where
ρr,1 = u
T
r Σ
−1
r vr, (24)
ρr,2 = w
Tv. (25)
By observing that θ does not depend on v and hence it is
a fixed value for a given S, the statistics of ρr under attack
depend only on the statistics of ρr,1 and ρr,2, which are two
Gaussian random variables. We now prove that the statistics
of ρr,1 and ρr,2 are given as follows:
E[ρr,1] = y, E[ρ
2
r,1] = y + y
2, var[ρr,1] = y,
E[ρr,2] = x, E[ρ
2
r,2] = x+ x
2, var[ρr,2] = x,
(26)
and
E[ρr,1ρr,2] = xy + y,
cov[ρr,1ρr,2] = y,
(27)
To derive the above relations, we start by proving that:
E[vvT ] = Σ + uuT , E[vrv
T
r ] = Σ + uru
T
r . (28)
To prove such properties, we observe that the element in
position (i, j) of matrix vvT is equal to vivj . The element
in position (i, j) of the covariance matrix Σ can be computed
as:
Σ = E [(vi − ui) (vj − uj)] = E [vivj ]− uiuj . (29)
Thus, E [vivj ] = Σ + uiuj and E[vvT ] = Σ + uuT . In the
same way
E[vrv
T
r ] = Σr + uru
T
r . (30)
The expectation of ρr,1 is clearly equal to:
E[ρr,1] = E[ur
TΣ−1r vr] = ur
TΣ−1r ur = y, (31)
hence, based on (28), we have:
E[ρ2r,1] = E[ur
TΣ−1r vrvr
TΣ−1r ur]
= ur
TΣ−1r E[vrvr
T ]Σ−1r ur
= ur
TΣ−1r
(
Σr + urur
T
)
Σ−1r ur
= y + y2.
(32)
In addition, the variance of ρr,1 boils down to:
var[ρr,1] = E[ρ
2
r,1]− E[ρr,1]2 = y. (33)
In a similar manner, we can prove that:
E[ρr,2] = x,
E[ρ2r,2] = x+ x
2,
var[ρr,2] = x.
(34)
Finally, by exploiting again the properties in (28), we can
write:
E[ρr,1ρr,2] = E[ur
TΣ−1r vrv
TΣ−1u]
= E[ur
TΣ−1r Svv
TΣ−1u]
= ur
TΣ−1r SE[vv
T ]Σ−1u
= ur
TΣ−1r S(Σ + uu
T )Σ−1u
= y + xy,
(35)
and then immediately:
cov[ρr,1ρr,2] = E[ρr,1ρr,2]− E[ρr,1]E[ρr,2] = y. (36)
The lemma follows immediately from relations (26)-(27),
by observing that
E[ρ] = E[ρr,1]− θE[ρr,2] (37)
and
var[ρ] = var[ρ1] + θ
2var[ρ2]− 2θcov[ρr,1ρr,2]. (38)
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